Neurophenomenological Theory of Freedom: Sartre’s Existential Philosophy and Hard Problem of Consciousness

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ABSTRACT

In late 20th century D. Chalmers came to the conclusion that consciousness is redundant in relation to the brain functioning and he called it the hard problem of consciousness. In this article a fusion of existentialism and quantum theories of consciousness will be proposed, with the result being a neurophenomenological theory of consciousness Quantum brain and Nothingness. An important base for the paper is the idea of direct connection between the hard problem of consciousness and the problem of free will that allows us to build a “bridge” between existential philosophy and the hard problem of consciousness. The main ideas of neurophenomenological theory of consciousness will contain the following: At present moment brain can be simultaneously in multiple states, because of the significant quantum effects that influencing neuron impulses. From the third person’s perspective the quantum brain looks like physical object, but in reality (i.e. “from the inside”, “brain for brain” or brain as “thing-in-itself”) quantum brain is consciousness. It means that the conscious and quantum neuronal processes are the same “something” that can be observed both from inside and from outside. Because of that consciousness exists simultaneously in multiple states. Further free “i” in the continuously processes of selection of one of the possible state of consciousness and automatically chooses one of the possible state of the quantum brain, causing collapse of its wave function as a result. Furthermore, consciousness is “quantum brain for quantum brain” and “i” that is in the continuous process of collapsing of brain’s wave function. Quantum states of brain are pressuring “i” requiring its own realization. This “pressure” and particular quantum states of the brain are represented as multitude of qualia for “i”. As a result, consciousness is emergent interaction of “i” and quantum states of the brain.

Key Words: hard problem of consciousness, existential philosophy, quantum physics, nothingness, qualia

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Introduction

In the 17th century with the development of the modern age science the idea of rigorous determinism of the physical world got a foothold. In an attempt to keep the agent free, Descartes strictly separated the physical world and consciousness by proclaiming their dualism. Reality turned into two parallel worlds, one of them following the deterministic physical laws, while the other does not. After Descartes, determinism started to infiltrate into philosophical and scientific thought in two different ways: the first is connected with Spinoza, and the other with development of neurosciences.
Spinoza expanded the idea of determinism in the physical world to consciousness by setting strict necessity of its acts. As a result, every thought, every perception and emotion got a cause (another thought, perception and emotion), and the “i” became redundant. Spinoza’s consciousness is a system of cooperating elements that can equally function without the “i” (with the sole thought of I am, I feel, I think). Later, Hume resumed this line of thought in philosophy by proclaiming consciousness to be a bundle of perceptions, while the “i” is just an illusion that seems to stand behind them but in reality does not (Hume, 1998). Spinoza’s determinist ontology of consciousness as such is not controversial, and it cannot be disposed using the language of classical logic, because it is based on this language itself. Classical logic like a filter conducts the real free controversial “i”, cuts off everything that does not agree with it and creates the non-controversial world of deterministic consciousness. As a result, determinists start to demand that the existence of the free “i” should be proved in terms of classical logic (as well as the existence of consciousness itself). However, in the matter of fact this dispute is a dispute over the question of which logic corresponds with the real world: “is it only classical Aristotelian logic or other dialectic logic of German philosophy and existentialism as well?”

But there is a second line of the “i” elimination in philosophy, where not only the “i” becomes redundant, but the whole consciousness. With the development of neurosciences in the 20th century it becomes clear that even if absolute determinism does exist in the physical world, and all physical neural processes correlate with conscious processes, it appears that the brain could function in the same way without those conscious processes, without consciousness at all (as shown by D. Chalmers in the mental experiment with the philosophic zombie).

According to the conditions of the mental experiment, zombie is a full physical twin of Chalmers, who having the same brain and the same neural processes, does not have consciousness and qualia, which means it is “all dark inside” him (Chalmers, 1996). And further it follows from theoretical basis of physics and neurosciences that as the brain of Chalmers and his philosophical zombie are the same, so the way the neurons function and therefore their behavior should be the same too, insomuch as one will not be able to tell from outside which of them possesses consciousness. For neurosciences and classical physics, there is truly no difference between Chalmers and his philosophical zombie, because the functioning of the brain depends only on physical laws, while consciousness even though it does exist, does not influence anything.

Thus consciousness is something redundant in the physical world and this is the problem.

The aim of this paper is to answer D. Chalmers’ question: "Why are physical processes in our brain accompanied by consciousness and cannot run in the same way without consciousness, qualia (inner emotional experiences)?"

Analytical philosophers trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness offered two types of consciousness ontologies: deterministic (emergent materialism, panpsychism, property dualism) and indeterministic (quantum theories).

In the first part of this paper we will prove that none of the aforementioned perspectives solves the hard problem of consciousness. At the same time of all consciousness ontologies the quantum theory is the closest to Sartre’s existential philosophy, and that’s why it is this theory that existential ontologies will be “laid on”. Ontology of existential philosophy was based on the ideas of German dialectics, and that’s why here prior to Sartre’s consciousness theory Fichte’s philosophy will be analyzed. Then will be critically analyzed Sartre’s theory of freedom including the idea of the subject being nothingness, non-existence and that’s why the subject can be free. Once Sartre’s philosophy is adapted to quantum theory of consciousness we will get neuroexistential (neurophenomenological) theory of consciousness (quantum brain and nothingness). This will be one of possible solution of the hard problem of consciousness within the framework of continental philosophy.

1. Hard problem of consciousness in analytic philosophy

In the 20th century in analytic philosophy of consciousness there were offered several
types of theories aimed at solving the hard problem of consciousness.

**Emergent materialism**

Emergent materialism suggests that consciousness is a new physical property of a big system of neurons that cannot be drawn out of the properties of the neurons themselves (Chalmers, 1996). But does emergent materialism solve the hard problem of consciousness? Why isn’t this emergent property redundant in relation to the brain functioning? Consciousness can’t be redundant in relation to our brain only if consciousness affects brain’s functioning. If the brain functions on the basis of the laws of classical physics, then this influence is not possible and the only way remaining for emergentism is to bring in quantum physics, which probably means that emergentism can be considered only as part of the quantum consciousness theories.

Furthermore, if consciousness is a physical property of highly organized substances, then as a physical property it should be seen from outside from the third person position. Physical properties of neurons (electric charge of the membrane, weight) are seen from outside, but consciousness as a physical property cannot be seen from the third person position. That’s why consciousness cannot be an emergent physical property. Should consciousness be an emergent property of brain, then it has to be non-physical, which means it should be seen only from inside. So this is already emergent dualism.

**Panpsychism (Russell, Chalmers)**

In early 20th century Russell came up with the idea that a material particle from the position of the third person – i.e., from the outside – looks like a physical particle, while from inside it could be something phenomenal, mental (Russel, 1954). Chalmers suggested that we call these properties protophenomenal to emphasize their dissimilarity from phenomenal experience of a higher level (Chalmers, 1996). “Electron for an electron”, “electron as a thing for itself” is something protophenomenal, and from the third person’s position subjectively it looks like a physical particle with such properties as mass and charge. And then “electron for an electron” is something simple, protophenomenal, and “brain for a brain” is something more complex, which means phenomenal consciousness.

Russell’s idea is interesting, but consciousness in such a theory can either be composed of protophenomenal aspects of brain particles, or be something emergent in relation to them. Inner aspect of an electron is in particular its phenomenally represented mass and charge, and this is something consciousness certainly lacks. If the brain’s protophenomenal aspects when interacting generate emergent phenomenal property (consciousness), then it should be seen from outside as a new “physical property”. But it cannot be seen, which means that Russell’s and Chalmers’ panpsychism does not solve the hard problem of consciousness.

Coming up with another panpsyclical idea of property dualism Chalmers supposes that the same pure information is simultaneously actualized in two spaces: the physical (and this is the brain with its special pattern of neural activation) and the phenomenal (and this is the consciousness) (Chalmers, 1996). But for the philosophic zombie pure information can be actualized only in physical space and it will still behave like a real person. In the end, the hard problem of consciousness is not solved by Russell’s and Chalmers’ panpsychism. Analytical philosophy has only two choices: to consider consciousness an epiphenomenon or address quantum theories of consciousness.

**Quantum ontology of consciousness**

Quantum theory presumes that consciousness is not redundant in relation to the brain functioning, because it is constantly choosing its future state (Eccles, 1986). It is possible because quantum particles are not in a definitive state, but in many states simultaneously (Greenstein and Zajontc, 2006). So if quantum particles affect even neural processes in a modest way, the brain itself becomes a quantum object, existing in many states simultaneously.

At the moment we don’t know whether there are essential quantum effects in our brain. Against the quantum theories of consciousness was made the assumption that all the quantum states in our brain would immediately decohere and would not essentially effect its functioning (Tegmark, 2000), but as was discovered recently, quantum effects exist even inside of
plants during the process of photosynthesis, and they do not decohere (Romero, 2014; Fuller, 2014). In his early works Chalmers was critical towards the quantum theory of consciousness, but over time this ontology has become more and more realistic for the Australian philosopher (Chalmers, 2002).

There is a dispute around the concrete localization of quantum effect in our brain. Eccles supposed that quantum effect is localized in the presynaptic vesicular network (Beck and Eccles, 1992), and Hameroff and Penrose – inside of the microtubules of the neuron’s cytoskeleton. (Hameroff, 1994). But now we have to understand the philosophical problematics of the quantum theories of consciousness. Let us suppose that there exists a quantum particle (it can be an electron, but rather something bigger), that at present is simultaneously in two places: close to neuron X and far from it. The location close to neuron X induces activation of this neuron, whereas the far location does not. As result the brain is at the present moment in two states simultaneously (in one of them the neuron X is activated, in the other - not). Further, we could imagine that the neuron X is for example a premotor neuron responsible for pulling the trigger of a machine gun by a person facing a hard moral decision. And when the consciousness is not in a hard situation of determinism, but the physical reality itself leaves to consciousness only two alternative choices – to pull or not to pull the trigger. This choice is happening constantly, the “i” is always facing multiple quantum states of brain, and the choice of one of them opens a new variety of future options. Consciousness is a constant process of choosing quantum states of the brain.

The Schrödinger equation is the main law of quantum physics. If you enter in it the current location of the quantum particle, it will calculate different probabilities of what will happen to it in a moment. For example, the Schrödinger equation will say that with a probability p = 0.8 the electron will be close to neuron X, p = 0.1 - close to the next neuron, p = 0.1 will be outside of the brain. Every possible quantum state of the brain has its strict mathematical realization probability, resulting from the Schrödinger equation.

**Criticism of quantum ontology**

In quantum theory of consciousness, the base for the choice made by the free “i” is not clear. Two quantum possibilities have their mathematical weight (0.8 and 0.2), but this probability of realization does not determine the choice, although cannot be violated by the free choice itself. But what is the base that “i” chooses one of the possibilities on? Mathematical probabilities only set the frame, but the choice itself remains unclear. How can a free choice happen other than based on some reasons, that completely determinate it and explain it? Can we think of the world and of the “i” other in some other way than, through the prism of mathematics and causality? In the world as a system of relationships between objects the “i” itself and its free choice always refer to something else, to motives, neural correlatives, mathematical quantum probabilities, but if the “i” is the pure reason of the free choice, that doesn’t refer itself either to the power of motives or to quantum probabilities, and it then looks like this choice is not determined by anything. In other words, the free “i” is in a certain sense empty, there is nothing objectal, deterministic and mathematical in it, it is beyond the existence.

**Quantum philosophic zombie**

In addition to D. Chalmers’ imaginary experiment we could imagine that a quantum philosophic zombie, having the same quantum brain as a real person does, but lacking phenomenal consciousness, would choose one of possible brain states automatically using a quantum random number generator (providing numbers within the probability distribution 0.8-0.2 of Schrödinger equation). And then again the quantum philosophic zombie from outside will not differ from a real living person. If you put them in a situation 100 times of one and the same completely identical moral choice, both of them will shoot approximately 80 times and not shoot about 20 times).

This is why, unfortunately, we have to come to the conclusion that neither of the analytic theories of consciousness can solve the hard problem of consciousness.
2. The consciousness problem in continental philosophy (Fichte, Sartre)

Fichte ("dualistic subject-object structure of consciousness")

Analytical philosophers prefer to talk about consciousness as phenomenal consciousness and its mental properties (qualia), not mentioning the dualism of the subject (the "i") and the object or even proclaiming illusiveness of the "i" (Dennett). Criticism of the subject happens in continental philosophy as well and there is a root cause for it. The subject-object structure of consciousness is connected with a fundamental contradiction that disappears by subject reduction. In the same way the presence of consciousness in the physical world is a contradiction that disappears when you proclaim it an illusion. In this paper, we will posit a conclusion that dualism of subject and object on one side and of consciousness and brain on the other is one and the same.

Fichte (split consciousness)

The problem of subject-object structure dualism was articulated by Fichte, the first continental philosopher. While Kant can be accepted by many analytical philosophers as an "inside man", starting with Fichte and Hegel it becomes impossible. Starting with Fichte, analytical (British-American) and continental philosophies headed in two different directions and this is what makes hard problem of consciousness so "hard" for analytical philosophers. Existential philosophy inherits Fichte’s and Hegel’s ontology, so it is necessary for us to take a look at German philosophy.

Fichte noticed that when the subject is the "i", then object is everything located inside of the consciousness, but is not the "i", which means it is the "not-i" (Fichte, 1889). Fichte’s consciousness is in the condition of constant splitting into "i" and "not-i" where "i" is trying to include all the "not-i", remove the border between "i" and "not-i" and become the unsplit absolute "i", but is unable to do it. And out of this supposedly unessential change of subject and object names it becomes obvious that consciousness is a contradiction, because it is united, which means it is one substance, but at the same time it is not united, because it consists of two contradicting substances (the "i" and the "not-i").

Is consciousness the "i"? Yes. Is consciousness the "not-i"? Yes. In Fichte’s philosophy in relation to one and the same logical object it becomes possible that one and the same statement is true and false at the same time, the principle of excluded middle is defied (consciousness is simultaneously the "i" and the "not-i", one substance and two). At the same time, Fichte himself is trying to get rid of this root contradiction from his idea of consciousness and return to Aristotelian logics.

For further analysis, we have to make an important conclusion that consciousness is an impossibility, expressed in two separated substances being simultaneously one, which means they are united and interact in a quale.

Sartre’s existential ontology of consciousness (nothingness in being)

Almost always when philosophy speaks about freedom, it faces the problem of defining the basis for free choice, if it is not the motives, their intensity, personality traits and other reasons. In the first half of 20th century two Russian philosophers at once, N. Berdyaev and A. Kojeve start to put forward the idea that ontological cause of freedom lies in nothingness. J.-P. Sartre for his part continues to develop more radical ideas by Kojeve: it is the person himself, the "i" that is nothingness, nihil (Kojeve, 1969).

These ideas are truly extremely counterintuitive. Classical idea of nothingness makes us place it beyond the borders of being. In our consciousness there is an image of nothingness it will turn into after death, but by Sartre and Berdyaev it is not an image of nothingness, it is the nothingness itself "located" in being and serving as a condition for the being to be engaged in the world (Sartre, 1984). So now being in an unknown way becomes not only being, but nothingness as well.

In Sartre’s existential philosophy this model is explained in the following way. There can be motives behind the subject’s decision that overbear each other, but they are merely the background, but not the cause of the choice. Not having any reasons to act, the subject remains in the emptiness of suppositionlessness, lost in the emptiness of transparent possibilities, none of them disposing any separate power, because only "i" can turn them into reality. As a result, the "i" remains in causal vacuum, the free "i" is
empty and turns into *Nothingness*, facing the possibilities it can choose any of (Sartre, 1984). This is the ontology where it is possible to choose freely between good and evil. There is a reason for the free choice and this reason is Nothingness. It may seem strange, but in Sartre’s freedom theory determinism is not offended. The free choice happens deterministically based on the “i” (nothingness) and it is possible because Nothingness is equally indifferent and independent to all motives. Sartre actually removes from the philosophic idea of freedom an essential ontological white space. If the “i” is Nothingness, then it can really freely choose any of competing motives. To say that the free choice happens without any reason or that its reason is Nothingness articulates two different ontologies (Gasparyan, 2012; 2014).

The world where Being is Nothingness at the same time has a different language and different logics, that doesn’t turn into a pure setting of senseless symbols. But locating being into nothingness Sartre and Berdyaev try to speak about a new world in the language of the old one, because a new language still has to be found, if it is possible at all. What happens is a total violation of formal logics, because the “non-A” (nothingness) is penetrating into “A” (being). A= “A” and “non-A”. Now we cannot split the world into objects like we did before and say that this is “a tree”, and this is a “non-tree”, reality looses its rigid discreet structure and starts to smear. It is not possible, nothingness cannot be inside of being, and that’s why the underlying, ontological ground of the world is the impossibility, and such a world is existing impossibility.

**Criticism of Sartre**

It is not clear whether ego is pure existing Nothingness or some paradoxical mixture of Being and Nothingness. This is one of the main problems of existential ontology. Being is transferred from the “i” into the “not-i”, which means that subject and object dualism is replaced by the dualism of nothingness (the “i”) and being (the “not-i”), but how does nothingness choose? And still, why does it choose something? Absolute nothingness should be completely indifferent to all possibilities. Maybe motives are the whole Being, but they are located outside of the “i”, which means Sartre’s Being and Nothingness are ontologically separated, they hardly ever contact. By making the fundamental structure of the world a contradiction (nothingness inside of being), Sartre immediately tried to eliminate this contradiction. That’s why it seems to me that for the free choice to exist the “i” should be nothingness, and we cannot say it is nothingness only.

3. **Neurophenomenological theory of freedom “Quantum brain and Nothingness”**

Now let us finally try to transfer Sartre’s theory and some of Fichte’s ideas onto a quantum theory of consciousness and to articulate a possible solution to the hard problem of consciousness within Sartre’s existential philosophy. Initially when analyzing consciousness in terms of the “neuroexistential” theory, there can be distinguished: the “i-nothingness” and the “not-i” (quantum brain, which means a variety of quantum states of brain, in each of them is encoded information about one of possible future states of the perceptive physical world and consciousness). In this way the subject and object dualism becomes dualism of subject and brain. If earlier the object was a “mental image” of external and inner world, now it is neural processes in our brain.

**Double intentionality**

But the “i” and the “not-i” are not enough for the phenomenal consciousness to appear. Consciousness is a relation of the “i” and the “not-i”, “attribution” of these quantum states to the “i”. Intentionality really exists and lies in the fact that the “i” is focused on these quantum states of brain, while they are conversely focused on the “i” itself, in other words the “i” “experiences” them as its possibilities and is motivated by them. This double focus produces qualia and the whole phenomenal world.

Kantian revolution cut consciousness off of the external world, in other words the object, located in the consciousness “moved under” subject (Kant, 1998). But if there is nothing external in consciousness, nothing that would confront it, it loses all dynamics. It still remains conceptually possible for the object to connect to the thing-in-itself, but it is not possible to know anything substantial about it. The object that had lost its independence, as it had been prescribed in Kant’s philosophy, gets its stature back. But
this object is quantum physical states of the brain. But not understood as things-in-itself, rather emergently uniting with the “i”. It is not possible to say that the “i” perceives the “not-i” and vice versa, but they do affect each other, they interact and during this process of interaction they exist as something united and emergent, in other words they become one “substance” (despite the fact that they continue to be two different “substances”).

Split state of qualia as quantum states of brain

For better understanding of neuroexistential theory of consciousness let us demonstrate it with a concrete example. Imagine that a German student, a social democrat, has been called up for military service where after some time he had been given the order to shoot a teenage partisan prisoner. The officer has long noticed that the student purposely misses the target when shooting and decided to give him one last chance before executing him by a firing squad. Let us take a look at his consciousness at the moment when the officer gives the order to fire and he is one moment away from saying Yes or No. Which means the next moment the decision will be made, Yes – to shoot or No – to shoot not.

The German student faces two possibilities that have several motives, expressed through different qualia. He wants to fire because if he doesn’t – he will be shot, so he has the motive to stay alive, he is afraid of nothingness. In his consciousness this motive is represented as an extreme fear of death. But if the “i” is nothingness, then how can it be afraid of becoming nothingness? In Sartre’s philosophy the “i” is nothingness itself, but the “i” is existing Nothingness in the first place, and in the second – this Nothingness-in-Being, that is Nothingness, standing before the possibilities, Nothingness located in the living world, Nothingness that is experiencing and feeling something. While death is Nothingness we cannot even say whether it does exist or not, it is something one cannot be, death is Nothingness-as-a-thing-in-itself.

The student doesn’t want to shoot, because if he does he will suffer from guilt, fear to lose himself and pity towards the prisoner. So he has three motives: fear, the feeling one can never get rid of, fear to disappear for oneself as a personality and pity that are deflected by consciousness and turn into feeling guilt, and personal fear and pity. This triple motivation structure can be called moral motive.

It is important to notice that motives can be represented for the “i” only as qualia. Motives press on the “i” urging for realization of some action and this pressure can be transmitted only through qualia that are directed on the “i”. If we don’t consider quantum physics, we could only say that two systems of neurons (fitting with two competing motives of moral and fear of death) trying to suppress each other to activate or deactivate premotor neurons, that induce shortening the finger and the shot. But in the case of quantum ontology the two future possibilities are already in the present. If the choice happens in the next moment, it means that in one quantum state of brain there has been taken the decision to fire and the premotor neuron has been activated (or will definitely be activated in a period of time), and in other state - not. The choice is something real, because two possibilities that are two quantum states of brain do already exist in the phenomenal consciousness and as qualia.

The difference between two quantum states of brain

Two quantum states of brain are 99.9 percent identical and differ only in activity of a small number of neurons. That is why the similar summarizes and becomes background and in the center of consciousness there is only the difference between the two quantum states that is whether the premotor neuron will be activated or not. So for example in two quantum states of brain the same activation of optic, temporal and parietal cortex is present, because whatever the German student chooses, the next moment he will still see the teenage partisan, will hear the dog in the village bark sadly and will feel the weight of the gun in his right hand. And in both quantum states of brain there are activated neural systems connected with both competing motives and differing only through the fact that to one motive has been said Yes, and to the other – No. In other words, the neural system of fear could overcome the resistance of the neural system of moral motives and activated the premotor neuron (despite that quantum physics offered this neuron a chance to remain deactivated). The student is hesitating between Yes and No and there is still a moment,
where both of these Yes and No exist simultaneously.

Before the decision is taken the “i” can jump from fear to moral concerns analyzing which of the motives it should prefer, but experiences them simultaneously. If at that moment the student would experience only fear of death, it would mean that there is only one motive in his consciousness at that moment and the choice happened automatically. But the choice does not happen automatically, because a quale is always split in several poles (in this case in two). On one part the student feels the fear of death, whereas on the other pity, guilt and fear to lose himself simultaneously. Many different qualia at the same time are one united quale. Being split is the most important characteristic of qualia. Qualia put the “i” under pressure splitting it and urging it to translate into action its possibility, not the opposite one. The more the two motives put pressure in different directions – the more “i” splits between “Yes-shoot” and “No-don’t-shoot”. The border between Yes and No lies in the split quale and only this border expresses the difference between two quantum states of brain, and the “i” can stay exactly on this border.

Only in a volatile split quale it can be expressed for the “i” that the “i-nothingness” is free of both motives. The free choice cannot be connected with the fact that one of the motives turned out to be more intense than the other (such a choice could have happened automatically, without the “i”). There is nothing in the motives what could indicate the choice to be made, that’s why the answer can only be found in the “i” that doesn’t contain anything itself. Only such “i-nothingness” can freely choose life or death. One of the most important paradoxes of ethics is that there would be no moral choice if the “i” were not nothingness.

**Why is the free “i” not only nothingness (postulated contradictions)?**

But there is another paradox of ethics. If the “i” is nothingness and nothing more, then the moral motive is beyond it, and that means that all moral choices will not be connected with values and as result the moral choice will not be able to exist. That is why during the choice process the ego splits so to say, it is exactly because it is indifferent to these possibilities, the “i” is inside them as well, because it wants to live and feels pity, despite the fact that the “i” is simultaneously beyond these qualia and motives, which means it is Nothingness, nothingness. The free “i” is nothingness, and the whole consciousness at the same time, it is so to say a coherent-split quale, expressing different motives.

This means that the “i” is simultaneously inside the consciousness (it is the consciousness) and beyond it. And no third is given, what could unite this contradiction. There is no coherent consciousness, rising over the contradictions. Or rather it does exist but at the same time it does not, it is united and not, because the “i” is inside it and beyond it. Even to say that consciousness “exists” means to make it united while it is split and not split at the same time. Philosophy that wants to take freedom and moral choice seriously has to postulate this contradiction.

**Conclusion**

Summarizing neurophenomenological theory of freedom “quantum brain and nothingness” we can say that consciousness is connected with a way of how the brain looks from “inside” at present. To be more precise we can say that consciousness consists of “quantum brain for quantum brain” and “i” that accomplishes the process of collapse of brain’s way function. Different quantum states conduct the pressure to “i” requiring its own realization and this pressure as well as quantum states are represented as subjective experiences (qualia) for “i”.

Yes, of course we can say that the quale of what it is like to see red color is not connected to the free choice, and that’s why Sartre’s theory of freedom does not explain the existence of the full range of qualia, which means it does not solve the hard problem of consciousness. This is really a problem, and still there is hope that the given direction of synthesis in continental and analytical philosophy could bring us closer to the solution of the hard problem of consciousness. In future there will be attempts to translate into the language of the hard problem of consciousness other theories of existential philosophy (Heidegger, Berdyaev), to be able to explain the full range of qualia.
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