DOI: 10.14704/nq.2018.16.5.1389

Cooperative Behavior analysis of Owners and Contractors Based on Brain Neurobehavioral Mechanism

Liping Zhao, Yuesen Wang, Dongye Sun, Yang Yang


According to the analysis of the bidding and tendering for Chinese railway engineering construction projects in the past 10 years, the strong reciprocity phenomenon between the owners and contractors that accepted and maintained the specific cooperation is discovered in this study. Based on the existing supporting theory of cooperation behavior in the field of brain science, the theory of strong reciprocity is proposed to analyze the game and cooperation mechanism between the owner and the contractor under the bounded rationality. Moreover, the evolutionary game model for the relationship between the owners and contractors of railway engineering projects is established in this research. Simultaneously, the numerical simulation analysis for the influence of different parameter variables on the evolution of the model is conducted. Finally, the results of the study show that when they anticipating the cooperation of the counterparty, the owner and the contractor will respond positively to cooperation. On the contrary, the owners and contractors or third-party regulatory agencies will punish uncooperative behaviors that disrupt cooperation rules. The research results about the cooperative behavior between the owner and the contractor coincides with the interpretation of cooperation in the field of brain science.


Strong Reciprocity, Brain Science, Cooperative Behavior, Owners and Contractors, Evolutionary Game Theory, Neurobehavioral

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