



# Manifestations of sectarian conflicts between Sunni and Shia during the Buyidera 334 AH / 447 AH

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## Abstract:

*The proliferation of sectarian conflicts among Islamic sects during the Buyidera led to aspects that weakened the fabric of the Abbasid state, tinting the Islamic society with weakness and dispersion among various sects in general, and between Sunnis and Shias in particular. This heightened animosities and disturbances, serving as a major facet of conflicts during that era. I will attempt to shed light on the prominent aspects of this dimension.*

**Keywords:** Buyidera, Abbasid state, Sunni, Shia, sectarian conflicts

**DOI Number:** 10.48047/nq.2023.21.7.nq23094

**NeuroQuantology 2023;21(7):1064-1073**

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## Introduction:

The political aspect was significantly influenced by sectarian conflicts during the Buwayhid (Buyid) era, manifesting in various facets, especially concerning the dynasties adhering to the Shia sect and their impact on the Sunni Caliphate. These dynasties operated as part of the Abbasid Caliphate in form but functioned independently in political and economic matters. Numerous rebellious movements emerged against the Abbasid Caliphate in Iraq and Persia, primarily driven by sectarian motives, weakening the Abbasid rule and benefiting its adversaries. Wars and conflicts intensified during this period, profoundly affecting the general aspects of social life. This included a decline in the state treasury, economic deterioration, neglect of agriculture, financial corruption, confiscation of properties, and the purchase of positions. In this article, I will address the impact of sectarian conflicts on the political aspect during this period.

### 1. Sectarian Dynasties:

The political landscape, like other aspects, was affected by sectarian conflicts among various Islamic sects during this period. The impact of these conflicts on the Abbasid Caliphate and the dynasties affiliated with it, both formally within the Abbasid Caliphate and independently in political, economic, and religious matters, became evident. The Sunni Caliphate in Baghdad, already weakened, saw an exacerbation of its frailty with the Shia Buyids assuming control of political power until the second decade of the fifth century AH. (1)

The establishment of these sectarian dynasties within the Abbasid Caliphate had grave consequences for Islam and the Islamic society. During these two centuries, most of the states that emerged adhered to the Shia sect, marking an era of Shia dominance within the boundaries of the Islamic state, with only a few exceptions that will be addressed in this article.

Furthermore, these states employed various intimidating and political tactics to suppress



other sects with different doctrines, asserting dominance over them. There was a bias towards the Shia sect and an empowerment of non-Arab elements within the state, accompanied by the persecution of other groups. This included diminishing their status, persecution, fueling sectarian animosities, all of which had a detrimental impact on the strength of the Abbasid state. (2)

The internal strife within the Abbasid state became a prominent feature, especially between the Buyid and Hamdanid states, clearly manifesting in the control over a weakened caliphate, particularly during the early era of Buyid rule, under rulers such as al-Mustakfi, al-Ta'i, and al-Muti. During their reign, the state reached the lowest levels of degradation.

Among the states that emerged during this period and staunchly adhered to the Shia sect, asserting its dominance by spreading its influence and suppressing other sects, we find:

**Shia Buyid State:** This Shia Buyid state took control of the caliphate and triumphed for the Twelver Shia sect, despite initially adhering to the Zaidi sect in the land of Daylam.(3)

**Hamdanid State:** Another Shia-affiliated state following the Rafidi Shia sect, the Hamdanid state in Aleppo and Mosul, was among the first to declare its separation from the Abbasid Caliphate during its weakened state. It moved to the northern parts of the Levant, with Aleppo as its focal point. The Hamdanid ruler, Saif al-Dawla, is renowned, and his court attracted scholars, literati, and poets. Despite its notable role in resisting the Byzantines on the borders of the Levant, internal Shia tendencies and its weakness, especially after Saif al-Dawla's death, encouraged Byzantine infiltration (4). Nevertheless, the state engaged in deadly wars with other Shia-affiliated states on its borders, namely the Buyid and Qarmatian states. (5)

**Samaniid State:** The conflict between the Buyids, Qarmatians, and Hamdanids, from a political perspective, stemmed from the control over the reins of power in Baghdad

and manipulation of the caliphs. Despite their adherence to the Rafidi Shia sect, political interests took precedence, and the Hamdanid state did not endure for long, falling into the hands of another Shia state, the Fatimid state, in 394 AH (1003 CE). (6)

**Samanid State:** The third state to emerge during this period was the Samanid state, named after a Persian man named Saman. Established between 261 AH/874 CE and 390 AH/1000 CE, this Shia Rafidi state had a Zoroastrian convert to Islam named Isma'il bin Naser as its founder. The capital initially was Samarkand, later shifting to Bukhara. Isma'il bin Naser is considered the true founder, transforming Bukhara into a capital marked by greatness and power. He defeated two Shia states in the region, the Safarid and Zaidi states in Tabaristan. The Samanid state extended its control over significant parts of Transoxiana, Khorasan, Jurgan, Ray, and Kerman, essentially encompassing most of Persia. It is noteworthy that this state promoted Shia Islam, making it the official religion in the region up to the present day, in what is now known as Iran. The Samanid state eventually fell to the Sunni Ghaznavid state. (7)(8).

As for the fourth state that emerged during these two centuries, it is the Qarmatian State, rightfully considered one of the most dangerous dynasties to appear during this critical period in the history of the Abbasid Caliphate. It exhibited heinous ideological and humanitarian atrocities, violating modesty, seizing wealth, corrupting morals, infringing on women's rights, hindering prayer and charity, and other pillars of the religion. It is evident that this state, founded in the darkness of Kufa, introduced a new religion distinct from Islam, claiming affiliation with Shia while being closer to a new belief system combining elements of Magianism and Manichaeism. Founded in Bahrain by Abu Sa'id al-Hasan al-Janabi, they disrupted pilgrimage routes for several years, desecrated the Meccan sanctuary, and took the Black Stone in a tale recounted by historical writings. Of significance in this

context are the grave repercussions this faction left on the Islamic Caliphate, advocating libertinism and assaulting children and infants. (9)(10)

As for the fifth state that embraced the Ismaili Shia sect, it is the Fatimid State, Rafidi in its orientation. Established by Ubaidullah al-Mahdi al-Isma'ili in 296 AH, its caliphs claimed descent from Fatimah al-Zahra, although this lineage has been refuted by multiple historical accounts. This state, which extended its influence in Islamic Maghreb, engaged in correspondence with the Buwayhids. (11)

It reached the point of handing over the Abbasid Caliphate to one of them, but Moez al-Dawla al-Buwayhi reconsidered the decision, fearing that if the Fatimids took power, people would obey them instead of the Sultan. This state, whose origins trace back to the Jew Maimon al-Qaddah, as mentioned by Abu Shama al-Maqdisi in his book "Uyun al-Rawdatayn," had numerous encounters with the Qarmatians, especially during the reign of the Fatimid al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah, who defeated the Qarmatian Hasan ibn Ahmad in several battles, indicating a state of hostility between them. (12)

Historian Will Durant adds that this state weakened in its later days to the extent that one of its caliphs, al-Mustansir al-Ubaidi, erected a pavilion where he indulged in nights of pleasure, music, intoxication, considering it more preferable than listening to the call to prayer or gazing at the Black Stone and drinking from the water of Zamzam. The reasons for its downfall were attributed to indulging in pleasures and vices. (13)

In addition to these notable states, there were lesser-known but Shia Ismaili-affiliated states. One such example is the Sulayhid state (429 AH/1037 CE – 1173 AH) in Yemen, founded by Ali bin Muhammad al-Sulayhi, who propagated Ismaili doctrine in Yemen with the assistance of the Fatimids. (14)

Examining these states that emerged in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Hijri calendar reveals crucial historical and

geographical points. Geographically, the Sunni Abbasid state became confined and besieged, represented only nominally in its capital, Baghdad. The actual authority rested in the hands of the Shia Buwayhid rulers. Additionally, the Caliphate faced depletion due to the costs of wars among these Shia states, neglecting jihad against the Crusaders and Zoroastrians on the Islamic frontiers. This period witnessed an unprecedented dominance of the secretive Shia doctrine, represented by the Qarmatians and Fatimids, threatening the Abbasid Caliphate. The Buwayhids aligned with them through treaties and agreements, contributing to the weakening of the central authority.

As for the caliphs of this period, except for al-Qadir Billah, they possessed nothing more than the palaces of the caliphate and the roles of their private quarters. The actual governance was in the hands of the Buyids, who controlled Iraq and northern Persia. In the east, the Qarmatian state held sway over southern Iraq, while in the Levant, the Hamdanids, Shia in orientation, exercised authority. The Ubaydids governed in Egypt and the southernmost part of the Arabian Peninsula. In Yemen, the Sulayhids, adherents of Shia Islam, were in control. Towards the far west and beyond the river, the Samanids and the Zaidis, both Shia, dominated. In essence, the Rafidi Shia sect prevailed, supported by the established power in the central governance in Baghdad. It is noteworthy that conflicts among these states were for power, not for the sect, as seen in the cases of the Buyids and Hamdanids. (15)

## 2. Undermining the Abbasid Caliphate:

The Buwayhid state, known as the Buwayhid era (334 AH - 447 AH / 957 CE - 1047 CE), constituted one of the periods of political weakness for the Abbasid Caliphate. During this time, the caliphate exhibited a high degree of subordination to the emergent dynasties. The exacerbation of sectarian conflicts between Sunni and Shia, in particular, and among other sects in general, further

weakened the Abbasid Caliphate. The caliphate found itself without effective decision-making authority, rendering the caliphate symbolic. With the exception of Caliph al-Qadir Billah, who attempted to restore the glory of the caliphate, the caliphs of this period were compliant and accommodative. Their reigns, with titles reflecting their characteristics such as obedient and compliant, marked a phase of submission.

This weakness manifested across all aspects of life within the Abbasid state—socially, economically, and politically. It signaled the beginning of the end for the caliphate. The fact that the Buwayhids, within a century (334 AH - 447 AH), managed to install all the caliphs of this period, starting with al-Mustakfi Billah, whom the Turkish commander Tuzun had initially appointed but was later deposed in a humiliating manner by Mu'izz al-Dawla, underscores the weakness of the caliphate. Mu'izz al-Dawla removed him from his turban with the help of two Dailami men, dragged him outside his court, and replaced him with al-Ta'í for Allah, his cousin. Subsequently, he also deposed him and appointed his son al-Tā'í for Allah. Finally, al-Qādir Billāh, the only one among the caliphs of this period, had a reign characterized by independence, strength, and the restoration of the caliphate's prestige. These aspects can be attributed to several prominent factors. (17)

- The personality of Al-Qadir Billah was characterized by firmness, strength, and determination. (18)  
After supporting the Buwayhid state and the beginning of its decline, internal conflicts within the Buwayhid family escalated, especially following the reign of Baha' al-Dawla. The power shift tilted towards Sunni factions, particularly the Hanbalis, who supported the Sunni caliphate.

This sectarian dominance has had a lasting impact on our present, evident in the Shia orientation of countries like Iran, previously adhering to the Sunni Shafi'ischool, as mentioned by al-Maqdisi in his book "Aḥsan al-Taḳāsim". The spread of this school of thought is also notable in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Yemen.

In Iraq, the exportation of the Twelver Shia doctrine became a significant responsibility, influencing various aspects of Islamic society. The sectarian affiliations of these states led to the emergence of several issues in the life of the Muslim community:

- Hindrance of some Islamic rituals and obligations, such as prayer, fasting, and almsgiving
- Legalizing forbidden acts, plunder, looting, and road blockades.
- The spread of ignorance and people's neglect of religious matters under the rule of a Shiite political authority that promotes extremist ideas, especially the ideas of the Qarmatians in Bahrain and the Ubayyids in Egypt.

The religious landscape began to shift in favor of the Sunnis at the beginning of the fifth century Hijri with the emergence of Caliph Al-Qadir Billah. This transformation is evident in his issuance of "Al-Aqida Al-Qadiriya," seeking the repentance of the followers of withdrawal and rejection in the year 408 H. He also denounced the lineage of the Ubayyids and issued multiple decrees protecting Sunnis from Shiites. (19)

As the Seljuks appeared on the stage, Sultan Subuktigin seized control of Transoxiana, supporting the caliph and adopting black as the color for their flags – the color of the Abbasids in the early days of their rule under Abu Abdullah Al-Saffah. Additionally, the weakening of the central authority among the Buyids due to family disputes is noteworthy.

It is worth noting that most of the states that separated from the Abbasid Caliphate maintained only nominal allegiance, either due to geographical distance, as seen in the

case of the Samanids, or owing to their strength and dominance, exemplified by the Qarmatians and the Hamdanids. Despite cultural and scientific advancements in some of these states, such as the Samanids and the Hamdanids, the political manifestations were clear. Additionally, the second branch of the Buyids gained independence in Fars and Kerman, led by the descendants of Imad al-Dawla, Rukn al-Dawla, and the emergence of internal conflicts within the Buyid family. (20)

The Buyids' religious influence also led to chaos and deviations, causing the Buyids to abandon Baghdad and the cities of Iraq to sectarian strife. Neither the caliphs nor the ministers could establish control or order, contributing to the weakening of the state, and there are numerous examples of this. The Buyid rulers governed public life by isolating and appointing whomever they pleased, displaying disregard for the feelings of the Sunni population, such as inscribing slogans cursing the companions and insulting the two sheikhs, without paying attention to the opinions of those close to them. (21)

Similar to what Mu'izz al-Dawla Buyid did with Caliph Al-Mustakfi Billah, this exemplifies one of the weaknesses of the Abbasid state represented by its caliphs. Additionally, the appropriation of treasury funds and their extravagant use, as well as the displacement of wealth for their supporters, were prevalent. Merely mentioning the name of the Sultan or the one prevailing over the state alongside the absent caliph unequivocally indicates that the position during this period was symbolic. The caliphs contented themselves with a continuous allowance for their households, which did not cover the needs of their wives and children, and they were satisfied with the caliphate in name only, without any formalities. (22)

However, a crucial observation in this regard is the Buyids' reluctance to completely eliminate the Abbasid Caliphate and assume its place. Perhaps this can be attributed to people's inclination towards the Abbasid family due to their noble lineage. Additionally, the Buyids considered the Abbasid Caliphate as a shield protecting them from the

ambitions of other claimants in the East, such as the Fatimids.

Despite this, the Abbasid Caliphate underwent significant influence and erosion of its foundations during these two centuries, making it susceptible to collapse. Some later caliphs, like Al-Qadir Billah, Al-Mustarshid Billah, and Al-Mustazhir Billah, managed to preserve the structure from crumbling. The success of the Sunni Seljuks in defeating the Buyids and their ruler, King Al-Rahim, played a role in establishing themselves in the realm of the Abbasid Caliphate. Consequently, the status of Shiites diminished in favor of Sunnis, particularly during the reign of the vizier Nizam al-Mulk. (23)

The final observation is that despite the independence of each prince in their own domain and the continuation of the caliph as a symbolic figure in Baghdad, the kings and princes of those regions acknowledged the nominal sovereignty of the caliphate. They offered prayers for the caliph in mosques, purchased titles, and sent gifts and money on various occasions. In other words, they maintained the religious authority, represented by the caliphate, while contenting themselves with temporal authority. They considered the Abbasids as having inherited the caliphate from the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, due to kinship and lineage. (24)

### **3. Dual Control and the Rise of the Caliphs:**

This situation did not extend beyond the increase in influence and interference in specific neighborhoods. However, the assumption of some of the caliber members of positions in the state can be considered a political shift created by sectarian conflicts at times and the general situation at other times. Since the entry of the Buyids into Baghdad, they had a significant impact, terrorizing the city and spreading corruption. One of them, named "Ibn Hamdi," a thief who emerged in Baghdad, plundered substantial wealth. The Sultan could not eliminate him, so he resorted to removing him, appointing him, and he became a feared figure, with people guarding

their homes at night for fear of this new faction. (25)

This occurred shortly before the beginning of Buyid rule. The influence of the caliber members had a profound impact on the Abbasid state when they seized control during the time of "Azz al-Dawla Bukhtiyar." Their influence even reached the point of cutting off water to the Shiite district of Karkh. Tabari mentions an caliber named "Aswad al-Zaid" among them because he used to go to the Zaid Bridge and eat openly with whoever was present, being naked without any concealment. (26)

During this period, each group of caliber members had leaders, with Shiite caliber members and Sunni caliber members, each fanatically supporting their sect. This led to turmoil during the reign of al-Muti' Allah when the caliber members rebelled, and each side showed extreme sectarianism, resulting in increased bloodshed between them. (26)

One manifestation of the weakness of the caliphate and the caliphs was that the Abbasid state became vulnerable to the Byzantine Romans, led by their king Nicephorus Phocas. He raided Muslim territories, capturing several cities between 350 AH and 961 AH, such as Aleppo, al-Massisa, and Tarsus. Despite the bravery of its inhabitants, the Romans then attacked Raqqa, Nisibis, and Diyar Bakr (27). People fled to Baghdad, expressing their anger at the caliph, insulting and throwing him in his palace while he was al-Muti' Allah. The Sunni and Shiite factions then turned against each other, leading to internal strife. At that time, Sultan Azz al-Dawla Bukhtiyar chose to leave things as they were, seizing the caliphate's funds for himself. Among the caliber members who assumed positions was the so-called Ibn Jumard, who took charge of guarding the markets during the days of the weakening of the state. (28)

Moreover, there was mockery of the Shia's feelings. The caliber members ignited fires on the night of Ghadeer Khum and slaughtered a camel in the morning. They committed disgraceful acts against the Shia, with the Sunnis following suit. They falsely presented the day as the one when the Prophet, peace be upon him, met Abu Bakr in the cave, which

supposedly occurred in the year 422 AH. All these manifestations indicate the weakness that the Abbasid caliphate reached during the Buyid era. (29)

In Baghdad, acts of theft and robbery increased to the point where the caliber members stole doors and windows of the Buratha Shiite mosque. They seized carpets, and the Buyid Sultan could not prevent it due to his weak authority (30). He could not control all neighborhoods of Baghdad, even though the mosque was within the confines of the Shia residential area. The dominance of the caliber members also extended to merchants and property owners, as they confiscated their money, goods, and homes. The caliber members spread to the region of Persia, where Ibn al-Jawzi mentioned that they killed the police chief and seven hundred men from the cargo carriers, violating the sanctity of Ramadan by eating and drinking openly in the daytime on the corpses (31). Later, they revolted in Baghdad after Baha al-Dawla left, controlling both sides of the city for months. The final observation in this regard is that sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia emerged during intermittent periods of Buyid rule, and the Sunnis among the thieves, in particular, intensified their oppression of the society. The Shia, in turn, experienced injustice and contempt at the hands of these individuals. (32)

4/ The Buyid ruler, Ahmad ibn Buyah, known as Mu'izz al-Dawla al-Buyhi, entering Baghdad in 334 AH (956 CE) marked the beginning of a new phase of control over the Abbasid Caliphate politically, militarily, and religiously. The situation worsened due to their strong bias towards the Shiite sect, their support for Shiites in Iraq and Persia, and the zealous tendencies of their ministers. The Buyids encouraged the Shiite movement within the state, leaving numerous negative impacts on the historical landscape. Their adherence to the Zaidi Shiite sect made them refuse recognition of the Abbasids' right to the caliphate, yet they maintained it for political and sectarian reasons, under the principle of allowing the "more virtuous" to lead, while still acknowledging the presence of the Abbasid caliphate. (31)

One aspect of the Buyid rulers' sectarian bias was their contempt and mockery of the Abbasid caliphs. This was evident in the case of Caliph al-Mustakfi bi-Allah, whom Mu'izz al-Dawla humiliated by dragging his turban on the ground and smearing his eyes with the hands of the Rafidites, on Mu'izz al-Dawla's orders in 334 AH, less than a month after entering Baghdad. This incident reflects the perilous state of the Abbasid caliphate, underscoring the degree of disrespect it suffered. Another example of sectarian bias is Mu'izz al-Dawla's aggression against the eastern part of Baghdad, predominantly Sunni, where he conducted arson, killing, and destruction in retaliation against the Rafidites (32).

Furthermore, Mu'izz al-Dawla, the paramount ruler of the Buyid state, was a fervent Shia supporter of their sect, earning him the title "Shahanshah," meaning "King of Kings" – a title never before used in Islam, hinting at audacious claims to divinity. His zealous nature extended to his ministers and officials, as he ruthlessly punished them for the slightest reasons, as seen in the case of his minister IbnBaqiya. His extreme bias led him to move the official center of the caliphate to Fars, with its capital in Shiraz, while keeping the nominal center in Baghdad.

In a significant development, the chief justice and all the state departments were relocated to Fars. The death of Azd al-Dawla marked the end of the era of control and dominance over the caliphate. His successors, although less skilled in governance and politics, maintained their sectarian biases. (35)

It wasn't only the Shiite rulers who exhibited sectarian biases towards their sect. The Caliph al-Qadir bi-Allah and his son, al-Qa'im (36), played a role in promoting the Hanbali doctrine. For example, al-Qadir bi-Allah's son, Ahmad ibnIshaq, who assumed the caliphate after the capture of al-Taa'i in 381 AH, was known for his Sunni sectarian bias. He authored a book on fundamentals where he highlighted the virtues of the companions in the order of the Ahl al-Hadith doctrine, declared takfir on the Mu'tazilites, and refuted the beliefs of the Rafidites. This book was recited every Friday to the people in the

al-Mahdi Mosque. Furthermore, the Caliph issued what is known as the "Qadari Belief," compiled by a group of scholars under his order in 408 AH, emphasizing the Sunni doctrine and rejecting the beliefs of the Rafidites and Mu'tazilites. (37)(38)

In 420 AH, al-Qadir bi-Allah removed Shiite preachers and replaced them with Sunni preachers (39). His son, the Caliph al-Qa'im bi-Amr Allah, was also biased towards the Sunnis. He withdrew the Qadari Belief in 433 AH, proclaiming it as the belief of the Muslims, and those who opposed it were considered sinful and apostates. (40)

As for the ministers, they had their share in fueling political animosity between sects based on their doctrines, supporting each faction or group in accordance with their beliefs. This was attributed to their merit and adept management of state affairs, as acknowledged by historians of that era. Among them were scholars, poets, and individuals of virtue and wealth.

They adhered to both Shiite and Sunni doctrines, while some followed the doctrine of seclusion (i'tizal). Their status during the Buyid period was significantly elevated. However, most of them suffered under the rulers of the Buyid dynasty, with notable figures like Ibn al-Amid. He served as a minister under Emad al-Dawla Ali ibnBuya, known for his literary and poetic talents. Scholars of literature have praised him with the words: "Writing began with Abdul Hamid and concluded with Ibn al-Amid." He was a devoted Shiite.

Another minister, Abu Muhammad al-Mahlabi, was distinguished for his precedence and wisdom (41). However, his fear of the Buyids led him to reconcile with them. This was evident in an incident in 340 AH/951 CE, where he apprehended some Shiite troublemakers but released them to appease Mo'izz al-Dawla, a staunch supporter of the Shiites. Despite his adherence to Shiite beliefs, he demonstrated a fair and unbiased approach in dealing with both sides, punishing individuals based on proven guilt without favoring one sect over the other. Nevertheless, he aligned himself with the

Buyids and their ruler, Mo'izz al-Dawla, out of concern for his position and standing. (42)(43) As for the minister Abu al-Fadlibn al-Abbas, he took a bolder stance than his predecessors. He ordered the burning of the Shiite neighborhood of al-Karkh to suppress discord during the reign of Azd al-Dawla, a decision influenced by Mo'izz al-Dawla. However, he met a tragic end in the later stages of his tenure. (44)

The minister IbnBaqiya initially served as a cook in the palace of Azd al-Dawla. However, circumstances and fate led this unremarkable man to attain the position of minister, a peculiar occurrence of that time. Upon seizing the ministerial position, he confiscated the properties of his predecessor, Abu al-Fadl, and his associates. However, due to his extravagance and poor management, he burdened the population with taxes and levies, leading to increased hardship, theft, and deteriorating conditions in the country. (45)

When Adud al-Dawla overcame Azd al-Dawla, he had IbnBaqiya executed in 409 AH. The poet Muhammad ibn Umar al-Anbari eulogized him with verses that have endured to our present day, describing them as the most beautiful lines ever composed for a crucified individual. The elegy begins:  
Soaring in life and in death's domain,  
Indeed, you are one of the miracles plain.  
As if people around you, when they stand,  
Stand in reverence, responding to your call, as planned.

As if you stand among them, a speaker profound,  
And all of them rise for the prayer, in worship unbound.

As for Abu al-Fath, the son of al-Amid, who was known as Dhu al-Kafaytain, he diverged from his father's path. The downfall of the house of al-Amid was due to his extravagance and arrogance towards the Buyids, attracting their wrath. Additionally, he was known to be fervently supportive of the Shia. (46)

One of the most notable ministers of this period was the minister and confidant Isma'ilibn 'Abbad. He held influential opinions

and counsel throughout the entire region of Persia. He served under Mu'ayyid al-Dawla and later under Fakhr al-Dawla. His funeral was widely attended by princes, ministers, scholars, poets, writers, and the public, who mourned him for many days in the year 385 AH. (47)

However, alongside these political figures, diverse groups of scholars, poets, and intellectuals gathered. The gatherings at Isma'ilibn 'Abbad included individuals from Shia, Sunni, Mu'tazili, Ash'ari, Zoroastrian, and Sabeen backgrounds. These interactions were driven by intellectual and scientific debates and competitions. (48)

### In conclusion

Through this study, we observe various points revolving around the dangers of these sectarian conflicts and their manifestations on the political side. The events that unfolded in the Islamic society during the Buyid era politically mark the actual decline of the Abbasid Caliphate due to these perilous aspects that stained the 4th and 5th centuries. It signaled the end of this major caliphate, though its fall was delayed until the 7th Hijri century, and the traces of this collapse persist to this day.

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The caliphate among the mills of these Rafidite states became clear, giving us a clear idea that the 4th and 5th centuries AH were a period of significant Shiite dominance. There remained in the Islamic world only the Umayyad Caliphate in Al-Andalus as a strong supporter of the Sunnis. See: Ibn al-Imrani, "Al-Inba' fi Tarikh al-Khulafa'," edited by QasimSamrani, Dar Al-Afaq Al-Arabiyya, Cairo, 1st edition, 1421 AH - 2001 CE, p. 174.
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The weakness of the Sunni caliphate's center had its impact on the deterioration of all aspects of public life in Iraq, particularly due to the lack of concern among these conquerors for economic life and urban development. With the exception of the era of Adud al-Dawla, all the princes of the Buyid dynasty fell short of the responsibilities, especially towards the end of the Buyid rule, focusing on taxes and levies without addressing urban development. This weakness constituted a significant point of vulnerability, leading to currency collapse, rising prices, increased poverty, and famine. However, there was an exception in Persia, where a form of political and economic stability was maintained, attributed to the bias of these rulers towards their own ethnicity rather than the Arabs in other lands. Consequently, the resources of Iraq were invested in Persia.
24. Al-Tabari, "Tarikh al-Rusul," the same source as above, Vol. 11, p. 355.
25. Al-Dhahabi, "Tarikh al-Islam," the same source as above, Vol. 29, p. 42.
26. Adam Mitz, "Al-Hadara al-Islamiyah fi al-Qarn al-Rabi' al-Hijri," Vol. 1, p. 20-21.
27. Al-Tabari, the same source as above, Vol. 11, p. 453.
28. IbnMiskawayh, "Tajrib al-Umam," the same source as above, Vol. 6, p. 374.
29. Adam Mitz, the same reference as above, Vol. 1, p. 25-26.
30. IbnMiskawayh, the same source as above, p. 338.
31. Ibn al-Jawzi, the same source as above, Vol. 15, p. 219.
32. IbnMiskawayh, the same source as above, Vol. 15, p. 213.
33. IbnMiskawayh, the same source as above, p. 374.

34. Ibn al-Jawzi, the same source as above, Vol. 16, p. 82.
35. Ibn al-Athir, the same source as above, Vol. 7, p. 439.
36. Ibn al-Jawzi, the same source as above, Vol. 7, p. 717.
37. The same source as above, Vol. 7, p. 717.
38. Mitz, the same reference as above, Vol. 1, p. 60.
39. Mitz, the same reference as above, Vol. 1, p. 60.
40. Al-Baghdadi, "Tarikh Baghdad," Vol. 5, p. 61.
41. Ibn al-Jawzi, the same source as above, Vol. 15, p. 279.
42. IbnKathir, the same source as above, Vol. 15, p. 526.
43. Al-Dhahabi, the same source as above, Vol. 29, p. 322.
44. Ibn al-Imad al-Hanbali, the same source as above, Vol. 4, p. 312.
45. Ibn al-Hanbali, the same source as above, p. 313.
46. Wafa Muhammad Ali, "Tarikh al-Dawla al-Buwayhia," p. 89-90.
47. Al-Tabari, the same source as above, Vol. 11, p. 429.
48. Al-Safadi, "Mu'jam al-Buldan," Vol. 1, p. 98.
49. Yaqut al-Hamawi, "Mu'jam al-Adib," the same source as above, Vol. 4, p. 1890.
50. Abu Nuaim Ahmad ibn Imran al-Isfahani, "History of Isfahan," edited by SayyidKasrawiHasan, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1st edition, 1410 AH - 1990 CE, pp. 258-259.  
See: Abu al-Hasan al-Bayhaqi, "History of Bayhaq," the same source, p. 263.  
Also, refer to: Kamal al-Din al-Anbari, "Nuzhat al-Alba' fi Tabaqat al-Adiba," edited by Ibrahim al-Samarra'i, Maktabat al-Manar al-Zarqaa, Jordan, 3rd edition, 1405 AH - 1985 CE, p. 238.  
Ibn al-Mustawfi, "History of the Messengers," edited by Sami bin SayyidKhmas al-Saqar, Ministry of Culture and Information, Iraq, 1980, page 92, vol. 2, p. 33. IbnKathir, the same source, vol. 11, p. 36.